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Perspectivism
Michela Massimi
1. Locating perspectivism in the landscape of realism
Among the many varieties of realism in contemporary philosophy of science, perspectivism – 
or better, perspectival realism – is one of the latest attempt at a middle ground in between 
scientific realism and antirealism. What kind of middle ground can perspectival realism 
possibly deliver, which has not already been explored by structural realism, semi-realism, 
entity realism, and selective realism, among others? In this chapter, I clarify (i) what 
perspectivism is; (ii) whether it can be made compatible with realism; and (iii) what it has to 
offer in terms of novel middle ground.
Some definitions, first. The term perspectivism is used to denote a family of positions 
that in different ways place emphasis on our scientific knowledge being situated. Thus, I take 
perspectivism to be first and foremost an epistemic view about the nature of our scientific 
knowledge. It is not intended to be a metaphysical view about scientific facts being 
perspectival; or natural kinds being relative to scientific perspectives. Scientific knowledge is 
here broadly understood to include scientific representations, modeling practices, data 
gathering, data analysis, and, more in general, scientific theories involved in the production 
of scientific knowledge. Being situated is understood in two main ways: 
(1) Our scientific knowledge is historically situated, i.e. it is the inevitable product of 
the historical period to which those scientific representations, modeling practices, data 
gathering, and scientific theories belong. 
And/Or
(2) Our scientific knowledge is culturally situated, i.e. it is the inevitable product of 
the prevailing cultural tradition in which those scientific representations, modeling 
practices, data gathering, and scientific theories were formulated.
The “and/or” is important. Some authors (notably, Ron Giere, the main advocate of the 
position) understand (1) and (2) as part of a unified picture about how scientific knowledge is 
situated. But several other authors would privilege and focus on either (1) or (2). Most of the 
recent discussions on perspectivism has indeed focused on (2), rather than on (1) for reasons 
that – as I explain in the next two Sections – have got to do with two different, and seemingly 
independent, rationales for perspectivism. 
Thus, the first distinction to draw is between a diachronic version of perspectivism, 
along the lines of (1), which places emphasis on the historical component; and a synchronic 
version of perspectivism, along the lines of (2), which explores how different research 
programmes, or alternative modeling practices (within the same historical period) may give 
rise to perspectival knowledge. The arguments and rationales for endorsing the diachronic or 
synchronic version of perspectivism are sufficiently distinct and independent of each other 
(see Sections 2 and 3). Some of the challenges that perspectivism (in either version) faces are 
similar, and similar are the answers that – in my view – perspectivism ought to give to these 
challenges, as I argue in Section 4. 
That our scientific knowledge is situated (either historically, or culturally, or both) 
may not strike as breaking news. It is at least as old as Kant’s Copernican Revolution and 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism. No wonder, then, that both are often indicated as forefathers to the 
position. Contemporary perspectivism shares indeed the same Kantian roots with Putnam’s 
internal realism. Like Putnam’s internal realism, perspectivism too is reacting against 
metaphysical realism and the so-called God’s eye view that claims: “the world consists of 
some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete 
description of ‘the way the world is’” (Putnam 1982: 49). There cannot be an objective, 
unique, true description of the way the world is as soon as we acknowledge that our scientific 
knowledge is always from a specific vantage point – either in the sense of (1), or (2), or both. 
Even more so, if we further acknowledge that these specific vantage points are often in 
conflict with each other (e.g. Ptolemaic astronomy vs. Copernican astronomy; electrons as 
corpuscles vs. electrons as elements of an ether in the nineteenth-century physics; and so on). 
Kant’s rediscovery of the human vantage point – the only vantage point from which 
knowledge of nature is possible for us – chimes with perspectivism’s insistence on the 
situated nature of our scientific knowledge. In this sense, contemporary perspectivism and 
Putnam’s internal realism are two branches of the same Kantian tree. Yet what is most 
interesting is not their (common) Kantian roots, but their ‘branching’, so to speak. The two 
positions part their ways in the underpinning rationales, and reading of Kant and his legacy. 
Internal realism is primarily prompted by semantic considerations, namely by 
Putnam’s famous permutation argument (Putnam 1982, ch. 2). The argument is designed to 
show that – even granted the truth-values of sentences can be held fixed in every possible 
world – the reference of the main terms would nonetheless be indeterminate. For it is possible 
to interpret the language so that ‘cat*’ refers to cherries and ‘mat*’ refers to tree. Thus, the 
sentence “A cat* is on a mat*” is still true in every possible world where “A cat is on a mat” 
is true, although the reference of cat* is permuted to pick out cherries and the reference of 
mat* is permuted to pick out tree (for a recent critical discussion, see Button 2013). No 
similar semantic concern prompts perspectivism in philosophy of science. Instead, epistemic 
and methodological concerns primarily motivate perspectivism (as we discuss in Sections 2 
and 3).
But there is more. Putnam read Kant as the first philosopher to advocate an ‘internal 
realist’ view of truth, whereby truth is “a statement that a rational being would accept on 
sufficient experience of the kind that it is actually possible for beings with our 
nature” (Putnam 1982: 64). Perspectivism –I take it – sees in Kant the first philosopher to 
defend the view that “Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with its 
principles in one hand, . . . and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance 
with these principles – yet in order to be instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited 
to him whatever the teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels witnesses 
to answer the questions he puts to them” (Kant 1781/87/1997, Bxiii–xiv). 
The relevance of Kant’s Copernican Revolution for perspectivism lies in the emphasis 
placed on the human vantage point from which questions about nature can be asked. That 
Kant defended truth as idealized rational assertibility (à la Putnam) is not clear from textual 
evidence. That Kant advocated objective and necessary knowledge of nature – incompatible 
with perspectivism’s pluralism– is also uncontroversial. Thus, the Kantian legacy for 
perspectivism lies, in my view, neither in the notion of truth, nor in the notion of objectivity. 
It lies instead in the acknowledgement of the human vantage point (as opposed to the God’s 
eye view) from which only knowledge of nature becomes possible for us. Perspectival 
knowledge is knowledge from a human vantage point (although not necessarily along the 
Kantian lines of postulating a priori conditions of possibility of experience in the faculty of 
sensibility and the faculty of understanding, of course). In the next two Sections, I unpack the 
epistemic grounds (Section 2) and the methodological grounds (Section 3), which are 
respectively at work in motivating the two (diachronic and synchronic) versions of 
perspectivism.   
2. Epistemic grounds for diachronic perspectivism: Giere’s 
perspectivism
That scientific knowledge is perspectival is evident from historical records. Knowledge 
produced by different scientific communities across different historical periods is 
perspectival: it is the product of specific choices of instruments, theoretical apparatuses, and 
measurement techniques idiosyncratic to any given scientific community at any given 
historical time. Thomas Kuhn first brought to the general attention this perspectival feature of 
scientific knowledge. He did not quite call it such, and opted for the idiom of “scientific 
paradigms” or “scientific lexicons” (rather than “scientific perspectives”). Yet, Kuhn’s 
rationale is pretty much the same rationale that motivates the most prominent advocate of 
scientific perspectivism: Ron Giere (2006). 
But it is not the late Kuhn of semantic incommensurability that provides the 
inspiration for Giere’s perspectivism (2006: 83): “It is clear, I think, that there are no 
problems of linguistic incommensurability for perspectives.” Instead, it is the early Kuhn, 
who defended epistemic incommensurability as rooted in perspectival theories, data, 
methodologies and values of different historical communities. Key to Giere’s perspectivism 
is the extension of the relational and perspectival metaphor of color vision to the whole body 
of scientific knowledge. Our ability to discern colors is due to our human vantage point and 
the ensuing relation among the refractive index of any given surface, light rays, and our 
retinas. Similarly, measurements in science are the outcomes of relations between the target 
system, and our technical apparatus (i.e. with its settings, relevant parameters etc.). 
Giere argues that scientific knowledge is perspectival all the way up, not just at the 
level of observation and measurement. Models and scientific theories are perspectival too: 
“Newton’s laws characterize the classical mechanical perspective; Maxwell’s laws 
characterize the classical electromagnetic perspective; the Schrödinger Equation 
characterizes a quantum mechanical perspective” (Giere 2006: 14). According to Giere’s 
model-based view of scientific theories, perspectivism affects each level of the hierarchy of 
models (from data models to representational models, all the way up to scientific principles). 
Experimental data are perspectival because they reflect the nature of the chosen measuring 
instrument (e.g. what counts as relevant or irrelevant parameter; how statistical errors and 
background noise are controlled, etc.). The representational models are themselves 
perspectival in idealizing some factors and abstracting from others (e.g. in the model of the 
harmonic oscillator, mass is idealized as a point-mass, and displacement from equilibrium 
abstracts from disturbing factors). Finally, the general principles (e.g. Newton’s laws) that 
inform the choice of the representational models are themselves perspectival. 
Giere’s perspectivism shares with Kuhn’s scientific paradigms the idea that “Claims 
about the truth of scientific statements or the fit of models to the world are made within 
paradigms or perspectives” (Giere 2006: 82; 2013). Or, “truth claims are always relative to a 
perspective” (Giere 2006: 81). Giere’s perspectivism takes on board the Kuhnian insight that 
there is no cross-paradigmatic (or cross-perspectival) notion of truth at the end of scientific 
inquiry. What counts as true (or false) is simply a function of how particular data models fit 
particular theoretical models. And since both kinds of models are perspectival, as a result, any 
model-based knowledge claim is either true or false only within the boundaries of the chosen 
scientific perspective. Under this influential epistemological reading of perspectivism, truth is 
relativized to scientific perspectives. Giere’s epistemological argument for perspectivism can 
be summed up as follows:
(A) Our scientific knowledge is perspectival because scientific knowledge claims are only 
possible within a (historically) well-defined family of models (e.g. the Newtonian 
perspective; the Maxwellian perspective; etc.), which constrain both the data available (via 
data models) and the interpretation of those data (via theoretical models and principles of the 
scientific perspective adopted). No knowledge of nature is possible outside the boundaries of 
historically well-defined scientific perspectives.
Despite clear similarities with the Kuhnian picture, it should be clear that a “scientific 
perspective”, in Giere’s own use of the term, differs from a scientific paradigm in some 
relevant respects. A scientific paradigm, or better what Kuhn called a “disciplinary matrix”, is 
broader than a scientific perspective (Giere 2006: 82) in including (in addition to data models 
and representational models) also systems of values and metaphysical beliefs of a given 
community at any given time. 
Beyond Kuhn, the second greatest influence for Giere’s perspectivism are science 
studies, with the post-Vietnam disillusion about the liberating power of science; and the 
contingency thesis defended by sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). From this second 
main source, Giere’s perspectivism inherits the rejection of “absolute objectivism”, i.e. the 
idea that scientific knowledge is the body of objective, non-contingent, socially neutral, and 
value-free truths. Diachronic perspectivism takes on board the lesson from the history of 
science and from scientific practice in acknowledging that no such objective, God’s eye 
scientific knowledge is ever available to us. Hence, perspectival realism is defined by Giere 
as the view that says: 
“According to this highly confirmed theory (or reliable instrument), the world seems 
to be roughly such and such.” There is no way legitimately to take the further 
objectivist step and declare unconditionally: “This theory (or instrument) provides us 
with a complete and literally correct picture of the world itself”. The main thrust of 
the arguments to be presented in this book is to show that the practice of science itself 
supports a perspectival rather than an objectivist understanding of scientific realism 
(Giere 2006: 6)   
To conclude, diachronic perspectivism is the view that takes the lessons from the history of 
science and scientific practice to support the conclusion that scientific knowledge is 
perspectival. The arguments behind this view are epistemic: they concern the elaboration and 
justification for scientific knowledge claims within scientific perspectives – broadly 
understood as hierarchies of models typical of any given historical period (e.g. Newtonian 
perspective; Maxwellian perspective, and so on). The realist’s truth and objectivity are both 
called into question. Truth is relativized to perspectives, and objectivity abandoned 
altogether. Is Giere’s perspectival realism realist enough to qualify for the title “realism”? 
Doubts arise as to whether relativizing truth to perspectives makes the position closer to 
relativism rather than to realism (Massimi 2015a raises and discusses this critique). We will 
go back to both truth and objectivity in Section 4, where we discuss whether perspectivism 
can in fact be made compatible with realism. Before doing so, we must turn our attention to 
other methodological (more than epistemic) considerations at work behind perspectivism.   
 
3. Methodological grounds for synchronic perspectivism: 
incompatible models
Engagement with the history of science is not the only possible avenue to perspectivism. 
After all, perspectivism in its synchronic version is a thesis about how – within the same 
historical period – different research programmes, or alternative modeling practices may give 
rise to perspectival knowledge. Unsurprisingly, perspectivism has recently been advocated in 
the context of the vast literature on scientific models. In a seminal paper, Alexander Rueger 
(2005) addresses the problem of how scientific realism can handle the problem of 
incompatible models for the same target system. Consider for example atomic models. They 
come in at least four main families (quark models, cluster models, shell models, and liquid 
drop models). Each of these families provides a different (incompatible) description of the 
atomic structure, its properties, and dynamics. Scientific realism holds that there are mind-
independent facts about atoms. So, one would expect our best models to deliver a description 
of these facts. Instead, we are left with a plethora of models providing incompatible 
representations of the atom, its intrinsic properties, and dynamical processes. 
To solve the problem, Rueger makes a perspectival move. For different models seem 
to offer different perspectives on the same target system (e.g. the atom, or else), whereby 
intrinsic properties of the target system turn out to be in fact relational properties. In this 
way, models do not deliver incompatible images of the same target system. Rather, they 
deliver only partial and perspectival images that can still be unified into a final coherent 
image, as realism would have it. 
Along similar lines, Paul Teller (2011) has argued that since models are idealizations 
(hence, inevitably imprecise), it is possible to have more than one model for the same target 
system (e.g. hydrodynamics and statistical mechanics for the description of water’s 
properties) without having to forgo realism. Neither of these models can legitimately be 
regarded as delivering the exact truth about the properties of water, because truth remains a 
non-attainable goal of scientific inquiry. (For a similar defense of the perspectival nature of 
scientific representation, see also van Fraassen 2008.) In its place, science offers a series of 
partial, idealized, imprecise perspectival images, which nonetheless succeed in advancing our 
knowledge of nature. The Rueger–Teller argument for perspectivism – as I am going to call it 
– is then a methodological argument (rather than an epistemological one) that goes as 
follows:
(B) Our scientific knowledge is perspectival because scientific knowledge claims are only 
possible within (culturally) well-defined families of models of any given scientific 
perspective at any given time (e.g. hydrodynamics and statistical mechanics in the 
contemporary treatment of water; quark models, liquid drop models, shell models, and cluster 
models, for the contemporary atomic theory). No knowledge of nature is possible outside the 
boundaries of culturally well-defined scientific perspectives with their pluralism about 
models.
There are analogies and disanalogies between (A) and (B). The epistemological and the 
methodological arguments share the Kantian insight about the central relevance of our 
conditions of possibility of knowledge. Our human (historical and cultural) vantage point 
shapes and makes possible our scientific knowledge claims about nature. Hence, the Kantian 
nature of perspectivism. However, (A) and (B) differ in the way they explicate the 
perspectival nature of our scientific knowledge. While (A) and (B) share a common rejection 
of objectivity; they diverge about scientific truth. 
(A) argues that the truth of our scientific knowledge claims is relative to historically 
defined scientific perspectives (e.g. what was true for Ptolemy proved false for Copernicus). 
By contrast, (B) takes pluralism about models as an indication that truth is either (Bi) a non-
attainable and (maybe not-so-desirable either) goal of scientific inquiry (Teller); or, (Bii) that 
truth can be preserved if we understand property-assignment to a target system as 
perspectival (Rueger). I have briefly mentioned at the end of Section 2 the somehow relativist 
flavor that seems to affect Giere’s (A). Here I want to mention two responses to (B) that drive 
a wedge in the choice between (Bi) and (Bii), with the result of making perspectivism fall 
back onto either a form of instrumentalism, or a form of scientific realism.
Margaret Morrison (2011) has challenged the claim behind (Bi) that partial, idealized, 
imprecise models can nonetheless expand our overall knowledge of the target system, even if 
truth remains a non-achievable goal. Consider nuclear physics. It currently features thirty 
alternative and inconsistent (not just incompatible) models that neither individually nor 
jointly are able to answer basic questions about the nature of nucleons and of the nuclear 
force. Morrison (2011: 351) concludes: “So, we are left in an epistemic quandary when trying 
to evaluate the realistic status of these nuclear models and the information they provide. (…) 
What is perhaps significant for philosophical purposes is that this is not a situation that is 
resolvable using strategies like partial structures, paraconsistent logic or perspectivism. No 
amount of philosophical wizardry can solve what is essentially a scientific problem of 
consistency and coherence in theoretical knowledge.” On Morrison’s reading then, the 
methodological argument for perspectivism (B), with its pluralism about models, slides onto 
a dangerous form of “view from everywhere”, which – like in Pirandello’s play One, No one 
and One Hundred Thousand – make perspectivism akin to a sophisticated form of 
instrumentalism about science. Maybe none of the available models is the true model of the 
nucleus; and maybe that is not a problem insofar as practitioners can avail themselves of 
several models as they see fit to their purposes every time. Yet, if this is indeed the situation, 
it is bad news for the prospect of cashing out perspectivism as a kind of realism. 
The opposite risk with (Bii) is that by understanding all properties of scientific objects 
as perspectival / relational qualities, the door is open to the scientific realist’s rejoinder made 
by Anjan Chakravartty (2010: 410) that “putatively perspectival facts may be 
straightforwardly understood as non-perspectival facts regarding how behavioural 
dispositions are manifested under different stimulus conditions. Let us label these 
‘dispositional facts’”. The prima facie inconsistency among properties assigned by different 
models need not be understood in terms of perspectival images of the same target system, 
ascribing different relational properties to the same entity.
It can more easily be understood in the idiom of scientific realism – in terms of 
dispositional properties of objects manifesting themselves in various stimulus conditions. 
Different contexts of investigation, different measurement systems and modeling techniques 
can simply elicit different non-perspectival, dispositional facts about the scientific entities, 
their properties, and manifestations. Prima facie relational qualities are nothing over and 
above different manifestation conditions for the same non-perspectival, dispositional 
properties of scientific entities. Perspectivism along the lines of (Bii) falls back onto 
dispositional realism.
Trapped in between the charge of instrumentalism, on the one hand, and the risk of 
falling back onto dispositional realism, on the other hand, the chances of cashing out a 
promising version of perspectivism seem dwindling. Can perspectivism fulfill the Kantian 
promise of knowledge from a human point of view, and, at the same time, be made 
compatible with realism? Can it deliver a middle ground in between realism and anti-realism 
in science? The next Section explains why defenders of perspectivism might still have 
reasons for optimism. 
4. Can perspectivism be made compatible with realism?
The epistemological argument for perspectivism left us with doubts about a lingering form of 
relativism (e.g., is truth really relative to perspectives, as Giere maintains?). The 
methodological argument landed perspectivism in the quandary of being either a form of 
instrumentalism about science (Bi); or collapsing onto dispositional realism (Bii). Where 
does the Kantian insight behind perspectivism go astray? And can it be made compatible with 
realism?
In what follows I offer my own diagnosis of the problem and suggest a possible way 
forward (programmatic as it is at this stage). Philosophers on either side of the debate on 
perspectivism have at best failed to draw a clear-cut distinction between objectivity and truth; 
at worst, they have conflated the two. For often enough perspectivism is presented as a view 
about facts being perspectival; or about properties being relational; or about truth being 
relative. Couched in this language, it is no surprise that perspectivism verges on either fact-
constructivism, or alethic relativism –and, needless to say, either option is a non-starter for 
cashing out a viable form of perspectival realism (if the title realism is still meaningful). If 
perspectivism has to be made compatible with realism, something ought to be said about facts 
not being shaped by scientific perspectives, or truth relativized to them. The culprit of the 
muddy waters surrounding contemporary discussions of perspectivism is, in my view, the 
tendency to understand the rejection of scientific objectivity (qua God’s eye view on nature) 
as tantamount to a much stronger (and non sequitur) claim about worldly states of affairs 
being relative to scientific perspectives. Perspectivism is often cast in the Kuhnian mould, 
whereby scientific communities are taken as producers and validators of their own 
knowledge claims, with no mind-independent states of affairs or norms for truth outside the 
boundaries of historically defined perspectives. 
In my view, this is an erroneous take on the perspectivist insight that no God’s eye 
view of nature is ever available to us. For one can accept and fully endorse that scientific 
inquiry is indeed pluralistic, and that there is no unique, objective, and privileged epistemic 
vantage point, without necessarily having to conclude that perspectives shape scientific facts, 
or relativize truth. In fact, I have argued elsewhere (Massimi 2015b), that not even Kuhn 
endorsed these bold and questionable views. And certainly, no contemporary perspectivalist 
should endorse them either. As both the epistemological and the methodological arguments 
jointly show, all there is to the Kantian / Kuhnian perspectivalist stance is that no knowledge 
of nature is possible outside the boundaries of historically and culturally well-defined 
scientific perspectives. Epistemic pluralism speaks against ‘objectivist’ realism as the view 
that there is a unique, objective, privileged standpoint for scientific investigation. But 
epistemic pluralism – per se – does not also speak against truth, or against perspective-
independent facts. Thus, I suggest that we understand perspectival realism (PR) as a form of 
realism about science along the following threefold lines:
(I) PR endorses the realist metaphysical tenet about a mind-independent (and 
perspective-independent) world;
(II) PR endorses the realist semantic tenet about a literal construal of the language 
of science;
(III) Finally, PR endorses the realist epistemic tenet in thinking that acceptance of a 
theory implies the belief that the theory is true (and even shares the realist intuition 
that truth is correspondence with states of affairs in the world). 
PR – as I understand it – can share with scientific realism the view that worldly states of 
affairs, the language of science, and truth as correspondence with states of affairs are all 
perspective-independent. What makes PR perspectival then? How does it differ from 
scientific realism? In my view, the rejection of the God’s eye view in PR leads to a genuinely 
novel and fruitful notion of perspectival truth and scientific progress across perspectives 
(among several other relevant aspects). Let us take a quick look at both of them (more details 
can be found in Massimi forthcoming a. and b., respectively).
What is it like to be true within a perspective? Perspectival truth can be regarded as a 
form of perspective-sensitivity, whereby scientific perspectives provides the circumstances or 
context of use defining the truth-conditions for knowledge claims in science. For example, 
we can interpret scientific models (with their inaccurate idealizations of the target system) as 
filling in contextual truth-conditions (understood as rules for determining the truth-values 
based on features of the context). Perspectival truth is then truth (qua correspondence with 
mind-independent states of affairs) but contextualised within the limits afforded by rival 
scientific models or rival historical perspectives. To use a toy example taken from Teller 
(2011), when asking what the properties of water are (for example, whether water is indeed a 
fluid with viscosity), one might get different answers depending on whether the context of 
use for this scientific knowledge claim is defined by hydrodynamics or by statistical 
mechanics (which treats water as a statistical ensemble of molecules). However, this is not a 
case of relativized truth, where the same propositional content can be assigned different truth-
values (true or false) by different perspectives. It is in fact possible to retrieve true knowledge 
claims about what appears as a primitive property of water (viscosity) in hydrodynamics from 
the statistical properties of molecules’ mean flow in the statistical-mechanical perspective, 
without having to conclude that the very same knowledge claim is true in one perspective, 
and false in the other. There are facts about water and its properties that are independent of 
scientific perspectives. And, more to the point, a perspectival realist can get these facts right. 
Perspectives – under the reading I am suggesting – provide contextual truth-conditions, 
which often enough can be ‘translated’ so to speak from one scientific perspective to another. 
As a result, we need to rethink the semantic requirement (II). It is still the case that – 
under this reading of PR – the language of science is interpreted literally (pace Putnam’s 
permutation argument) so that “viscosity” refers to viscosity (and cannot be concocted to 
refer to electric charge, for example). However, contextual truth-conditions imply that the 
exact reference of the term “viscosity” is somehow undetermined until the contextual truth-
conditions are put in place. 
Thus, I take PR to share important aspects with contextualism. For  truth-conditions 
for scientific knowledge claims vary in interesting ways depending on the context in which 
they are uttered and used. At the same time, PR differs from a linguistically-geared view such 
as contextualism in acknowledging with (I) that there are perspective-independent worldly 
states of affairs that ultimately make our scientific knowledge claims true or false. There are 
worldly states of affairs about water’s viscosity that ultimately make (X) <Water is a liquid 
with dynamic viscosity of 1.983 × 10-5 Pa s> either true or false. Yet our ability to know 
these states of affairs (and hence to ascribe a truth-value to the relevant knowledge claim) 
depends inevitably on the perspectival circumstances or context of use. For example, for me 
now to know that <Water is a liquid with dynamic viscosity of 1.983 × 10-5 Pa s>, some 
perspectival truth-conditions have to be met. For example, I may want to check that samples 
of water satisfy the Navier-Stokes equations; I can look at rheology for predicting the 
mechanical behavior of water under the action of particular forces and stresses; I can run tests 
on water samples (relying on different viscoelastic models); and so forth. 
Contextual truth-conditions can then be understood in terms of perspectival standards 
of performance-adequacy that a scientific knowledge claim has to satisfy (for details on this 
notion, please see Massimi forthcoming a. and b.). While perspective-independent states of 
affairs are ultimately the tribunal that decides whether any knowledge claim is true or false, 
for us to know that (X), for example, is true, it has to be the case that not only (X) matches 
some worldly state of affairs, but also that it meets the relevant perspectival standards of 
performance-adequacy in its context of use. 
This is where the perspectival story becomes salient. While a scientific realist would 
consider “correspondence with the world” enough for the purpose of realism, a perspectival 
realist (who takes the situated nature of our scientific knowledge at heart) would not consider 
“correspondence with the world” enough. After all, scientific knowledge claims are not truths 
sub specie aeternitatis. They are instead the expression of  particular communities at 
particular historical times, working within well-defined intellectual traditions. Hence the 
importance of perspectival standards of performance-adequacy in the original context of use 
in defining whether any scientific knowledge claim is (perspectivally) true. 
Mutatis mutandis, perspectival standards of performance-adequacy (in and of 
themselves) are not enough to define whether a scientific knowledge claim is true or false. 
PR has to be able to assess falsehood and to make sure that our perspectival knowledge 
claims do indeed latch onto perspective-independent states of affairs. Thus, the perspectival 
standards adopted by any given community at any given time per se are necessary but not 
sufficient to establish whether any given scientific claim is indeed true. Scientific 
perspectives cannot sanction their own scientific truths. For this reason, we need to bring in 
another element: the notion of scientific progress across perspectives.
Scientific progress can be characterized in perspectivalist terms if we take scientific 
perspectives not just as contexts of use laying down specific standards of performance-
adequacy for knowledge claims. But, most importantly, if we take scientific perspectives also 
as contexts of assessment offering standpoints from which claims of other (past) scientific 
perspectives can be evaluated (in terms of their ongoing performance-adequacy as set out by 
their original standards). Thus, scientific claims of our historical predecessors can be retained 
or withdrawn, depending on whether they continue to satisfy their original standards of 
performance-adequacy when assessed from another (subsequent) perspective. Fresnel’s 
equations are still (to some extent) part of our current scientific perspective because of their 
ongoing performance-adequacy when assessed from our current vantage point. 
Ancient Greek crystalline spheres are no longer part of our current scientific 
perspective because they have long lost their performance-adequacy with respect to their own 
original standards (e.g. stability of circular orbits; agreement with astronomical data; neat 
division between celestial and terrestrial phenomena; etc.). By the time of Kepler, Galileo, 
and Newton crystalline spheres had proved incapable of delivering on their own original 
standards, since orbits turn out to be elliptic; the Prutenic tables replaced the Alfonsine tables, 
which could not deliver the right date for Easter; the orbital stability was now explained by 
the parallelogram law; and the rationale and evidence for the divide between terrestrial and 
celestial physics had been removed once and for all. Hence, crystalline spheres failed by their 
own standards (following Kuhn on anomalies and periods of crisis) and were eventually 
withdrawn from the repertoire of the Newtonian perspective. Were crystalline spheres ever 
(perspectivally) true in their own original scientific perspective? No, insofar as there are (as 
far as we can tell) no crystalline spheres in nature (the ancient Greek perspective cannot 
sanction its own truths). 
Yet, crystalline spheres performed in the original perspective an important function in 
providing a first hypothetical mechanism for planetary motion, for which a more adequate 
mechanism was later provided by Newton’s gravity (as a force acting at a distance) and an 
even more adequate mechanism was subsequently provided by Einstein’s general relativity 
(in terms of mass-energy tensor curving spacetime). In what sense were these mechanisms 
“more adequate” in subsequent perspectives? Simply because they took a primitive, 
hypothetical, non-further-explainable mechanism for orbital motion (crystalline spheres) and 
replaced it with new mechanisms which satisfied standards of performance-adequacy such as 
experimental accuracy (e.g. via Brahe’s observational data for Kepler’s elliptical orbits; or 
Eddington’s solar eclipse expedition for general relativity); projectibility (e.g. Newton’s law 
of gravity; Einstein’s principle of equivalence); and so forth. 
Thus, scientific progress tracks (to the best of our fallible and revisable knowledge in 
any given historical period) worldly states of affairs across scientific perspectives. Scientific 
knowledge claims of our predecessors are not discarded out of hand as simply false. Instead, 
their important role in the experimental, theoretical, and conceptual evolution of our current 
scientific toolkit is acknowledged and embraced. Most importantly, PR does not take our 
current scientific toolkit as the privileged, unique available one. It recognizes instead that our 
current vantage point is just one among many others that have preceded us, and that will 
follow us. Hence, a defender of PR would not say: “our current scientific truths are the best 
ones, full stop. We got it right!”. Instead, she ought to be saying: “our current scientific truths 
are the best ones we are entitled to by our own lights as of today”. PR amounts to a form of 
epistemic humility when it comes to truth and progress in science.
5. Pluralism and pragmatism  
Epistemic humility is not, however, a unique feature of PR. It is common to varieties of 
realism that share with PR a commitment to pluralism, more in general. John Dupré’s (1981) 
promiscuous realism, Sandra Mitchell’s (forthcoming) pragmatic realism, Chakravartty’s 
(2011) sociability-based pluralism, Kitcher’s (1993) real realism, among many others, are all 
equally committed to a form of pluralism and hence to epistemic humility. What kind of 
pluralism is distinctive of PR? And how does it differ from the pluralism at stake in these 
other positions? 
As the analysis in the preceding sections indicates, the pluralism at stake in PR 
originates from the perspective-sensitivity of our scientific knowledge claims. This is neither 
pluralism at the level of (perspective-independent) facts, nor at the level of taxonomic 
classifications. It is instead a distinctively epistemic form of pluralism in bringing in the very 
many contextual/perspectival conditions of knowing. How does this form of epistemic 
pluralism square with others when it comes to metaphysical import? Consider the following 
three cases: 
i. (i) Chakravartty’s sociability-based pluralism can be regarded as a minimal 
pluralist requirement that can be made compatible with realism. Groupings of properties can 
be carved and re-carved in many ways (although some of these properties have a tendency to 
‘hang out’ together more than others). Thus, pluralism about taxonomic classifications (qua 
sociable groups of properties) implies pluralism about mind-independent kinds in nature. 
i. (ii) Dupré promiscuous realism embraces a form of taxonomic pluralism too, 
whereby the same object may feature in cross-cutting classifications (e.g. the gardener’s and 
the botanist’s classifications for lily; hemlock as a vegetable and a poison). Yet, Dupré’s 
taxonomic pluralism is non-committal as to the mind-independence of kinds. Indeed, it is best 
understood as realism about individuals (e.g. this particular lily) but not about natural kinds 
qua higher taxa (e.g. Liliaceae).
i. (iii) Pragmatic realism also embraces a form of taxonomic pluralism, which on the 
face of it, seems very close to the contextualist considerations behind PR. For the pragmatic 
realist commits herself to different descriptions of the same target system, depending on the 
particular perspectival practice relevant to any given situation. For example, in the case of 
protein folding, there are three different models (in vivo, in vitro, and in silico) that can 
interchangeably be used to describe the same phenomenon for different purposes. The prima 
facie incompatibility of these different modeling practices does not undermine realism 
because of the purely pragmatic stance towards the metaphysics of science.
PR differs from (i)–(iii) as follows: 
By contrast with the ontological pluralism seemingly implied by Chakravartty’s sociable 
properties, PR keeps epistemic pluralism safely detached from ontological pluralism. While 
agreeing with sociability-based pluralism about patterns of mind-independent properties in 
nature, PR’s pluralism does not buy into its ontological implications. Our multiple ways of 
knowing do not track multiple mind-independent kinds in nature. At best, they track the same 
historically and culturally evolving kinds as per (A) and (B).
While promiscuous realism is ultimately nominalist about natural kinds, PR is 
committed to a realist view about kinds. Natural kinds are real because they map onto mind-
independent clusters of properties in nature. It is our conditions of possibility of knowing 
these clusters of properties that depend (in relevant ways) on our scientific perspective.
Against pragmatic realism, PR holds that a commitment to pluralism is not purely 
pragmatic – i.e. it is not just in terms of utility or serving particular functions in particular 
contexts. The epistemic pluralism at the heart of PR serves instead the purpose of tracking 
truth across perspectives. As such, it is kosher to the realist plea for truth, rather than to the 
pragmatist quest for fulfilling the epistemic needs of agents in scientific research. 
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